The Constitution of India guarantees a charter of Fundamental Rights to every citizen, enshrined in Part III (Articles 12–35) of the Constitution. These rights are the basic human freedoms that every individual in India is entitled to enjoy for a life of dignity and liberty. They range from equality before the law and freedom of speech to protection against exploitation and the right to constitutional remedies. Fundamental Rights operate as limitations on the power of the State, ensuring that government authorities cannot encroach upon essential personal liberties without constitutional sanction. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar famously called the Fundamental Rights “the conscience of the Constitution,” and in particular hailed the right to constitutional remedies as “the heart and soul of the Constitution”【32†L958-L965】. In this article, we delve into the origin and scope of these rights – their historical genesis, what each right entails, key Supreme Court interpretations (from Kesavananda Bharati to Maneka Gandhi), reasonable restrictions on these rights, recent developments, the judiciary’s role in expanding rights, and some common misconceptions.
The idea of guaranteed fundamental rights in India emerged long before the Constitution was drafted. During the independence movement, Indian leaders and thinkers demanded rights protections in any future governance framework. As early as 1931, the Indian National Congress at its Karachi session adopted a resolution on fundamental rights, outlining freedoms like freedom of speech and press, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of conscience and religion (subject to public order and morality), equality before law irrespective of caste or creed, and universal franchise【35†L166-L174】【35†L175-L183】. These were meant to reassure the masses that Swaraj (self-rule) would bring not just political independence but also social freedom and justice. Later, in 1945, the Sapru Committee Report and others also recommended a bill of rights for India.
When the Constituent Assembly convened in December 1946 to draft the Constitution, a dedicated Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee (headed by Acharya J.B. Kripalani) was formed to propose a list of rights. Their work was informed by earlier documents like the Nehru Report of 1928, which had outlined a “rights of the people” section including rights to free expression, equality before law, freedom of religion, and even socio-economic rights like universal education【1†L185-L193】【3†L213-L221】. In fact, scholars note that 10 of the 19 clauses of the Nehru Report’s bill of rights were eventually reflected in the Constitution, either as fundamental rights or as non-justiciable Directive Principles【3†L213-L221】. Internationally, the Assembly was influenced by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted in 1948) and other national constitutions (e.g. the U.S. Bill of Rights), but the Indian rights charter was crafted to suit India’s unique needs.
Key debates in the Constituent Assembly centered on the scope and justiciability of these rights. There was consensus that certain core rights (like equality, freedom of speech, freedom of faith, etc.) must be enforceable in courts. However, there was debate over including socioeconomic rights (like right to education, work, health) as fundamental rights – eventually most of these were placed in the Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV) as guiding principles, not directly enforceable. The Assembly also fiercely debated specific provisions: for example, the phrase “procedure established by law” in Article 21 (Right to Life) was chosen over a U.S.-style “due process” clause, as some members feared courts could strike down social legislation if a broad due process clause were adopted. The Right to Property was another flashpoint – members representing large landowners wanted strong protections, while others wanted the State to freely enact land reform. The compromise was to include property as a fundamental right (Article 31) but allow laws regulating or acquiring property under certain conditions. (This continued to be contentious for decades, leading to multiple amendments and eventually the deletion of the fundamental right to property in 1978, discussed later.)
When the Constitution was adopted on 26 November 1949, Part III contained an extensive list of Fundamental Rights. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, as Chairman of the Drafting Committee, described the Right to Constitutional Remedies (Article 32) as “the heart and soul” of the Constitution, emphasizing that rights without remedy would be meaningless【32†L958-L965】. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, in his speeches, hailed these rights as stepping stones to social revolution, enabling citizens to challenge injustices. At the same time, the framers acknowledged that no right could be absolute – each right in the Constitution comes with permissible limits to balance individual liberty with the common good and security of the nation.
Part III of the Constitution lists six broad categories of Fundamental Rights【52†L168-L176】, after the 44th Amendment reforms:
Originally, the Constitution also included the Right to Property (Article 31) as a fundamental right, but this was removed by the 44th Constitutional Amendment in 1978, and is now merely a constitutional/legal right under Article 300A【52†L172-L176】. Thus, today we speak of six fundamental rights groups. Notably, some of these rights are available only to citizens (e.g. Article 19 freedoms) while others are enjoyed by all persons including foreigners (e.g. Article 14 equality, Article 21 life and liberty)【52†L175-L182】【52†L187-L195】. We will now explain each category of Fundamental Rights in detail, with examples and landmark Supreme Court judgments that have shaped their interpretation.
“Equality before the law” is the cornerstone of the rights in Articles 14–18. Article 14 guarantees that “the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India”【12†L1-L4】. This means everyone, citizen or otherwise, is equal in the eyes of the law and is entitled to equal legal protection. However, equality does not mean absolute equality or uniformity in all circumstances – it permits reasonable classification. The Supreme Court clarified early on (in Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar, 1955) that Article 14 forbids “class legislation” (arbitrary laws favoring one group over another) but allows reasonable classification for legislative purposes【28†L31-L39】. In other words, the law can treat different categories of people differently if there is a rational basis for doing so, and the classification is not arbitrary. For example, giving certain benefits to historically disadvantaged groups is permissible classification, not a violation of equality.
The Right to Equality includes specific applications of this principle:
Article 15: Prohibits discrimination by the State against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. It also forbids restricting access to public places on these grounds【8†L311-L320】. At the same time, Article 15 allows affirmative action: the State can make “special provisions” for women, children, socially and educationally backward classes, or Scheduled Castes and Tribes【8†L323-L331】. For instance, reservations (quotas) in education or jobs for backward classes are enabled by Article 15(4) (added by the First Amendment, 1951) and Article 15(5)【8†L325-L333】. A landmark case, State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951), struck down caste-based communal quotas in education as violating Article 15; this provoked the First Amendment which inserted Article 15(4) to constitutionally authorize reservation policies【8†L323-L331】. Later, in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) (Mandal Commission case), the Supreme Court upheld 27% reservation for Other Backward Classes (OBCs) under these provisions but introduced the concept of “creamy layer” (excluding the advanced among OBCs) and capped total reservations at 50% to maintain overall equality【8†L327-L335】【8†L337-L340】. More recently, the Constitution was amended (103rd Amendment, 2019) to introduce 10% reservation for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) among the unreserved category (Article 15(6) and 16(6)). The Supreme Court in 2022 upheld this EWS quota, holding that it did not violate the basic structure of equality even though it was an economic classification.
Article 16: Guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment and bars discrimination in government jobs on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth or residence【8†L341-L349】. Like Article 15, it permits reservations in government jobs for backward classes (Article 16(4)), and even relaxation of qualifying marks or promotions for SC/ST candidates (Article 16(4A)) through constitutional amendments made to protect affirmative action【8†L367-L370】【8†L311-L319】. A notable judgment, M. Nagraj v. Union of India (2006), upheld the constitutional amendments allowing reservations in promotions, but said the State must show backwardness, inadequacy of representation, and maintain administrative efficiency in doing so. In 2020, the Court clarified that Article 16 does not mandate reservations – it is the State’s discretion to implement them, though once implemented, it should conform to constitutional parameters.
Article 17: Abolishes “untouchability” – declaring it a punishable offence to enforce any disability arising from untouchability. This was a direct assault on caste-based social discrimination prevalent against Dalits. Parliament enacted the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 and later the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 to enforce this article. For example, denying someone entry to a public temple or access to a well because of their caste would violate Article 17 and invite legal penalties. The social evil of untouchability has significantly reduced due to legal and social reform, although caste discrimination has not vanished entirely.
Article 18: Abolishes titles of nobility. The State cannot confer any title on a citizen (except academic or military distinctions). Indian citizens are also prohibited from accepting titles from foreign states. The intent was to ensure an egalitarian society without a title-based hierarchy (a reaction to practices like British knighthoods). However, national honors like Bharat Ratna or Padma awards are allowed. The Supreme Court ruled in Balaji Raghavan v. Union of India (1996) that such civilian awards are not “titles” under Article 18, provided they are not used as prefixes or suffixes to the recipient’s name【26†L13-L20】. The awards are seen as recognitions of merit, not ennobling someone to a higher rank in society, so they were held constitutional【26†L13-L20】.
Landmark judgment – Kesavananda Bharati (1973): While not about a single equality provision, the Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala case had a profound effect on all fundamental rights including equality. Faced with constitutional amendments that curtailed property rights and allowed laws to override fundamental rights (Articles 31C etc.), a 13-judge bench of the Supreme Court propounded the “Basic Structure” doctrine. It held that Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution does not extend to altering its basic structure【19†L65-L69】. Fundamental rights (and equality and liberty in particular) were deemed part of the basic structure. The Court upheld Parliament’s authority to amend rights to an extent, but said it cannot damage or destroy their core values【19†L65-L69】. Thanks to this, the basic features of equality (like rule of law, judicial review, secularism) are safe from being amended out of existence. Kesavananda thus cemented the supremacy of fundamental rights in India’s constitutional scheme.
Real-life examples: The Right to Equality has enabled numerous citizens to challenge discriminatory laws and practices. For instance, gender equality campaigns have used Article 14 and 15 to strike down laws that treated women unequally. In Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (1981), service conditions that forced air hostesses to retire upon first pregnancy were invalidated as arbitrary and discriminatory. More recently, in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018), the Supreme Court decriminalized consensual gay sex by reading down Section 377 of the IPC, on the reasoning that it violated equality and dignity of LGBTQ persons. The Court affirmed that LGBT individuals are entitled to full and equal citizenship, and that sexual orientation is a protected attribute under equality and privacy rights【49†L15-L23】. Justice Indu Malhotra memorably observed that history owed an apology to LGBTQ people for the unjust stigma. Similarly, in Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017), the practice of instant triple talaq (divorce) in one pronouncement was struck down as void for being arbitrary and discriminatory against Muslim women, hence violating Article 14. These examples underscore that the Equality right is a living principle, constantly being applied to modernize Indian society and remove unfair discrimination.
The Constitution of India guarantees a cluster of essential freedoms to citizens under Article 19, and additional protections of life, liberty, and due process in Articles 20–22. Together, these provisions form the bedrock of personal liberty in India.
Article 19(1) enumerates six fundamental freedoms for all citizens of India【29†L183-L191】. Every citizen has the right: (a) to freedom of speech and expression; (b) to assemble peaceably and without arms; (c) to form associations or unions (including cooperatives, as per the 97th Amendment)【29†L185-L193】; (d) to move freely throughout India; (e) to reside and settle in any part of India; and (g) to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business【29†L185-L193】. (Note: The originally listed right (f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property was deleted in 1978 along with Article 31, as mentioned.) These rights are crucial for the functioning of a democracy – they enable people to express opinions, protest, form unions and political parties, migrate for opportunities, and choose their livelihood.
Reasonable restrictions: None of these freedoms is absolute. Article 19 itself, in clauses (2) through (6), permits the State to impose “reasonable restrictions” on each freedom for specified purposes. For example, freedom of speech (19(1)(a)) can be curtailed by law in the interests of “the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, public order, decency or morality,” or to prevent contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence【29†L198-L204】. Freedom of assembly can be restricted on grounds of public order and sovereignty【29†L201-L209】, and so on. The requirement is that restrictions must be reasonable (not arbitrary or excessive) and must be imposed by a duly enacted law, not by executive whim. The judiciary stands as the arbiter of reasonableness – any law or executive action curbing 19(1) freedoms is subject to judicial review. A classic illustration is the Supreme Court’s judgment in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), where it struck down Section 66A of the IT Act (which criminalized online “offensive” messages) as an unreasonable restriction on freedom of speech. The Court found Section 66A to be vague and overbroad, not fitting any permissible ground in Article 19(2), thus void for violating Article 19(1)(a). This shows how the Court ensures the balance between freedom and social interests is maintained.
Let’s look at each freedom in practice along with key interpretations:
Freedom of Speech and Expression: This includes the right to express one’s opinions by word of mouth, writing, printing, pictures, or any other communicative medium. It covers freedom of the press, the right to information, and even the right to silence (the Court has held that forced national anthem participation, for instance, violates free expression). This freedom has been used to protect journalists and dissenters – e.g., Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras (1950) struck down a ban on a magazine, establishing that public order could be a valid restriction only after the Constitution was amended (and indeed, the First Amendment in 1951 added “public order” and “incitement to an offence” as grounds in Article 19(2)【29†L198-L204】). The Supreme Court has clarified that hate speech, obscenity, defamation etc. are not protected and can be penalized under reasonable restrictions. In recent times, the Court in S. Rangarajan (1989) and Shreya Singhal (2015) has robustly defended speech, emphasizing that open criticism of government and advocacy, even if unpopular or offensive to some, is part of the essence of Article 19(1)(a) – a pressure valve in a democracy. However, speech that directly causes incitement to violence or public disorder can be curbed. The evolving challenge is regulating online speech and misinformation while respecting freedom; the 2015 Shreya Singhal case was a major step in asserting that vague internet censorship laws are unconstitutional.
Freedom of Assembly: Citizens can hold meetings and take out processions peaceably and without arms. This right forms the basis of protest and demonstrations. Authorities can require permits for large gatherings to ensure public order, and unlawful, violent assemblies (riots) are obviously not protected. During recent protests (such as the 2017 Marina beach pro-jallikattu protests or the 2019 anti-CAA protests), Article 19(1)(b) was cited by demonstrators to justify their right to protest, while authorities invoked public order concerns under Article 19(3) to impose curfews or section 144 CrPC restrictions. The courts generally uphold the right to peaceful protest but allow reasonable time-place-manner regulations by authorities. In 2020, the Supreme Court in the Shaheen Bagh protests context noted that public spaces cannot be occupied indefinitely by protesters, suggesting a balance must be struck between protest rights and other citizens’ convenience.
Freedom of Association: Individuals have the right to form associations, unions, trade unions, societies, clubs, political parties and now explicitly co-operative societies (after the 97th Amendment added “or co-operative societies” to Article 19(1)(c)【29†L187-L193】). This right allows people to collectively pursue interests. It is subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of sovereignty, public order, morality, etc. The government can ban associations that are violent or secessionist (for instance, banning a terrorist organization). The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) provides a procedure for banning organizations deemed threats to sovereignty or public order – such bans have been challenged, but courts generally uphold them if due procedure is followed and evidence shows the group is engaged in violence or anti-national activities. Trade union strikes and bandhs also involve a tussle between association rights and other public rights; the Supreme Court has held that while forming unions is fundamental, there is no fundamental right to strike or disrupt others’ activities.
Freedom of Movement & Residence: Citizens can move freely within India and reside in any State (Article 19(1)(d) and (e)). This cements the ideal of one nation with no internal barriers. Reasonable restrictions can be imposed for security or public interest – for example, certain border or tribal areas require special permits (Inner Line Permits in some North-Eastern states) to protect indigenous populations. During epidemics or riots, movement may be temporarily restricted. But a law cannot arbitrarily bar citizens from relocating to another state for jobs or education. The freedom of residence has been used to invalidate legacy provisions that limited migration – e.g., the freedom allowed women who married outside their native state to continue domicile there (overturning old rules that tied a woman’s domicile to her husband’s). In Jammu & Kashmir (when Article 370 was in effect), there were residence restrictions for ownership of land by outsiders; after the reorganization of J&K in 2019, those have been eased, raising new debates on balancing local interests with free movement.
Freedom of Profession: Every citizen has the right to practice any profession or carry on any trade, business or occupation (Article 19(1)(g)). The State can regulate or restrict certain professions in the public interest – for instance, require licenses for lawyers, doctors, or regulate the sale of alcohol and other harmful goods. Monopoly rights can be imposed by the State in certain trade (e.g., state monopoly on railways or atomic energy). The Supreme Court has held that while citizens have freedom to do business, “reasonable restrictions” could include qualifications (like professional degrees) or licensing that ensures health, safety, and morality. In Chintaman Rao v. MP (1950), the Court struck down a blanket ban on anyone engaging in certain agricultural processing as unreasonable, noting the restriction must not be excessive relative to the problem. Today, debates around this freedom include the extent of regulation on cryptocurrency trading, gig economy jobs, etc., which involve balancing innovation and public interest.
Article 20: Protection in Respect of Conviction for Offences – Article 20 provides three vital safeguards to any person accused of an offence: (1) No ex post facto law: one cannot be convicted for an act that was not a crime at the time of its commission, nor given a penalty greater than what existed at that time【31†L532-L540】. (So, if a new law makes something illegal or enhances punishment, it cannot apply retroactively to past actions.) (2) No double jeopardy: no person shall be prosecuted and punished twice for the same offence【31†L537-L540】 – this forbids duplicate punishment by courts for the same crime (although a person can face both criminal prosecution and a civil action separately, since civil damages are not “punishment”). (3) Right against self-incrimination: an accused cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself【31†L538-L541】. This means confessions must be voluntary; the police cannot torture or coerce an accused to confess or to provide evidence against themselves. It is the principle behind the “Miranda” style warnings in India (though we don’t have a Miranda per se, CrPC Section 313 and Evidence Act ensure confessions to police are inadmissible unless made before a magistrate). In modern context, this right was invoked in cases like Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010), where the Supreme Court held that narco-analysis, lie-detector tests, and brain mapping without consent violate the right against self-incrimination and personal liberty. Article 20’s protections apply both to citizens and foreigners, and even during emergency these cannot be suspended. They ensure basic fairness in criminal law. For example, if Parliament tomorrow creates a new offense or increases a sentence, it cannot punish someone retroactively; and if you are tried and acquitted for a crime, you cannot be tried again for the same instance of that crime (though an appeal to a higher court or a retrial in certain situations is allowed, that isn’t “second prosecution” but continuation of the first).
Article 21: Protection of Life and Personal Liberty – This single sentence, “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”【31†L541-L544】, has been interpreted as widely as the sky by our Supreme Court. Article 21 is available to all persons (citizens or non-citizens) and has become the fountainhead of numerous unremunerated rights through judicial interpretation. Initially, in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950), the Court read Article 21 narrowly, saying as long as there is a “law” duly enacted, any deprivation of liberty was valid, without the Court examining if the law was fair. This changed dramatically in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) – a landmark that ushered in a liberal, dynamic interpretation of Article 21. The case involved impounding of Maneka Gandhi’s passport without fair hearing, and she challenged this as violating her right to personal liberty and movement. The Supreme Court famously ruled that “procedure established by law” in Article 21 does not merely mean any enacted law – the procedure itself must be “right, just and fair” and not “arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive”【25†L9-L16】. If the procedure is unjust, it is no procedure at all, and would violate Article 21【25†L9-L16】. In effect, the Court imported the essence of “due process of law” into Article 21 – requiring that laws affecting life and liberty must pass the test of fairness and reasonableness【25†L9-L16】. This Maneka Gandhi ruling also established the inter-relationship of fundamental rights (the so-called “Golden Triangle” of Articles 14, 19, and 21): any law depriving life or liberty must also not violate Article 14 (equality) and Article 19 (freedoms) if applicable. This case opened the floodgates for judicial creativity in expanding the scope of “life and personal liberty” to include a whole host of implied rights necessary for a life with dignity.
Right to life = right to live with dignity: In Maneka and subsequent cases, the Court asserted that the right to life is not merely the right to animal existence or mere survival, but to live with human dignity【23†L1-L4】. Over time, many rights have been read into Article 21 as part of the right to live with dignity. To list a few that the Supreme Court has recognized:
Right to Privacy: Although not explicitly stated in the Constitution, this was declared a fundamental right under Article 21 (and other rights) by a 9-judge bench in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017). The Court unanimously held that privacy – the right of an individual to control information about themselves and make intimate decisions – is intrinsic to life and liberty【38†L74-L82】. This historic verdict overruled previous contrary rulings (including the infamous ADM Jabalpur emergency-era case as discussed below)【38†L86-L94】. Privacy now protects a person’s bodily integrity, personal choices (food, sexual orientation, etc.), and information privacy, subject to reasonable restrictions for legitimate state interests. Following this, issues like the legality of Aadhaar (biometric ID) were tested on privacy grounds – the Court upheld Aadhaar in 2018 with some safeguards, balancing welfare objectives with privacy.
Right to Clean Environment: Through cases like MC Mehta v. Union of India (various environmental PILs in the 1980s and 90s), the Court has interpreted the right to life to include the right to a healthy environment, including clean air and water. This has been the basis for measures against industrial pollution, vehicular emissions, and preservation of forests. The Court invoked Article 21 to order the cleanup of the Ganges River, introduce CNG for Delhi public transport to curb air pollution, and hold that environmental protection is essential for life quality.
Right to Livelihood: In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985), a case concerning pavement dwellers evicted from Mumbai streets, the Supreme Court held that the right to livelihood is an important facet of the right to life – because no person can live without the means of living (employment). While this does not mean the State must provide a job to everyone, it means the State cannot deprive someone of their livelihood arbitrarily, e.g. by sudden eviction without rehab or by cancelling a job without due process. This doctrine has influenced policies on slum evictions (requiring rehabilitation schemes) and termination of employees (mandating fair hearing).
Right to Education: Initially derived from Article 21 by interpretation, this was later made explicit by the 86th Amendment in 2002 inserting Article 21A, which provides: “The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as the State may, by law, determine.”【33†L564-L570】. Education is now a fundamental right for children in that age group. A corresponding law – the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (RTE) Act, 2009 – provides the framework for its implementation. Even beyond age 14, the Directive Principles (Article 41 and 45) guide the state to strive for universal education. The Supreme Court in Mohini Jain (1992) and Unnikrishnan (1993) cases had earlier read education as part of Article 21, which prompted the constitutional amendment to firmly cement it as a fundamental right.
Right to Food: In the context of the mid-day meal scheme and starvation deaths, civil society invoked Article 21 to push for a right to food. The PUCL v. Union of India case (known as the Right to Food case, 2001 onwards) led the Supreme Court to direct governments to implement food security schemes, considering freedom from hunger as integral to the right to life. This case was an impetus behind the National Food Security Act, 2013.
Right to Health: While not explicitly listed, the Supreme Court has on multiple occasions (such as Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of Bengal, 1996) held that the right to life includes the right to healthcare. Government hospitals cannot refuse emergency medical treatment, and the State has a constitutional obligation to safeguard the health of citizens. In recent times, this was significant during the COVID-19 pandemic – High Courts and the Supreme Court, citing Article 21, directed governments to ensure oxygen supply, make reasonable regulations, and vaccinate citizens, underscoring health as an essential aspect of life.
Right to Dignity and Autonomy: Article 21 has been the springboard for rights of vulnerable groups and personal autonomy in various contexts. For example, the Court recognized the right to reputation as part of dignity (implied in Article 21), but balanced it with free speech rights. It acknowledged transgender persons’ rights to self-identify their gender (in NALSA v. Union of India, 2014) under Article 21. It also upheld the right to choose one’s partner (right to marry a person of choice) as part of liberty – in cases like Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. (Hadiya case, 2018), the Court intervened to protect an adult woman’s choice to marry. In 2022, the Supreme Court held that unmarried women have an equal right to safe abortion up to 24 weeks of pregnancy under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, reading the law in light of fundamental rights to equality and privacy – essentially affirming reproductive autonomy as part of a woman’s personal liberty.
Right to Die with Dignity: The Court was initially hesitant to recognize any form of right to die. In Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996), it held that the right to life did not include the right to end one’s life, thus upholding the criminalization of abetment of suicide. However, it left open the issue of passive euthanasia. In Common Cause v. Union of India (2018), the Supreme Court acknowledged that a terminally ill person or a person in persistent vegetative state has the right to refuse life-prolonging treatment, and allowed “living wills” under strict safeguards. This was derived from Article 21’s guarantee of dignity – the logic being that forcing a person to endure unbearable suffering against their will violates the right to a dignified existence.
This list is not exhaustive – Article 21’s scope continues to grow as new challenges emerge. Importantly, even when the Emergency provisions (Article 352) are in effect suspending fundamental rights, after the 44th Amendment Articles 20 and 21 cannot be suspended, ensuring the core right to life and liberty remains inviolable. This was a hard lesson from the 1975-77 Emergency, when even the right to life was effectively suspended – leading to the infamous ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976) judgment where a majority of the Supreme Court held that no person could even approach a court for unlawful detention if Emergency was proclaimed. That dark chapter has since been overruled – the Supreme Court in the Puttaswamy (privacy) judgment explicitly stated that ADM Jabalpur was wrongly decided and is overruled, affirming that fundamental rights like life and liberty cannot be “surrendered” even in an emergency【38†L86-L94】. Today, judicial attitudes and the 44th Amendment guarantee that the Right to Life and Liberty is absolute even during national emergencies – a significant constitutional safeguard.
Article 22: Protection Against Arrest and Detention – Article 22 provides procedural safeguards for persons arrested or detained. It differentiates between ordinary criminal arrests and preventive detention (detention without trial, to prevent future harm). For ordinary arrests, Article 22(1)–(2) guarantees that an arrested person must be informed of the grounds of arrest “as soon as may be” and has the right to consult and be defended by a lawyer of their choice【33†L567-L575】. Further, the person must be produced before the nearest magistrate within 24 hours of arrest (excluding travel time), and cannot be kept in custody beyond 24 hours without the magistrate’s approval【33†L568-L576】. These reflect the principles of habeas corpus and due process, aimed at preventing illegal detention or police abuse. Many Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) provisions (like Section 50: right to know grounds of arrest, Section 57: 24-hour rule, etc.) mirror these constitutional rights. If the police violate these (e.g., secret detentions, denial of lawyer), the detention becomes unlawful – courts have not only released such detenus but even awarded compensation for breach of fundamental rights (as in D.K. Basu v. State of W.B., 1997, where guidelines for arrest and interrogation were laid).
Article 22(3) allows an exception for enemy aliens and persons detained under preventive detention laws, where the above rights (information of grounds, 24-hour production, etc.) can be curtailed. Preventive detention means detention without charge or trial, intended to prevent a person from committing a future offense or threat (for example, detaining a person suspected of terrorist links to stop them from acting). Because this is an extraordinary power prone to abuse, the Constitution lays down some limits in Article 22(4)–(7): No preventive detention can be for more than 3 months unless an Advisory Board of independent experts (usually judges) approves a longer detention【33†L583-L591】. The detainee has the right to be informed of the grounds of detention (Article 22(5)) and to make a representation against it, except if disclosing all grounds is against public interest【33†L579-L587】. Parliament is authorized to specify the maximum period of detention and procedural details (Article 22(7)). Over the years, Parliament provided laws like the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) during the 1970s (infamous during Emergency), and today laws like the National Security Act (NSA) and state-level preventive detention laws (for bootleggers, etc.) exist. Courts generally cannot question the subjective satisfaction of the executive in preventive detention if procedures were followed, but they ensure that the procedural safeguards (like Board review, communication of grounds) are complied with, otherwise detention is quashed.
Preventive Detention vs. Article 21: There is an inherent tension between Article 21’s promise of liberty and preventive detention. The Constituent Assembly, having the bitter experience of colonial-era preventive detentions, still allowed this provision, considering the turbulent post-independence security scenario. But they wanted it hedged by safeguards, and indeed after the excesses of Emergency, the 44th Amendment strengthened Article 22 by (not yet operationalizing) a provision to reduce the initial detention without review from 3 to 2 months for national-level laws. Even though that amendment (Art. 22(4A)) hasn’t been brought into force【33†L592-L600】, courts remain vigilant. A landmark case here is the ADM Jabalpur (1976) or Habeas Corpus case during Emergency, where the majority infamously held that during a national emergency, when Article 21 was suspended, detainees had no right to approach courts even if tortured or killed in custody. Justice H.R. Khanna’s lone dissent asserted that such a position would make a mockery of law – “even the life of an Indian citizen is at the mercy of the State, a situation not contemplated by a Constitution that seeks to establish rule of law.” This majority view, as noted, has since been denounced and is considered one of the Court’s worst rulings, explicitly overruled in 2017【38†L86-L94】. Today, even if a national Emergency is proclaimed, habeas corpus petitions for unlawful detention must be heard since Article 21 remains active.
Article 22 has also been used by courts to strike down preventive detention orders that don’t follow procedure. For example, if the government detains someone under a preventive law but doesn’t communicate the grounds of detention in a language they understand or doesn’t place the matter before an Advisory Board in time, courts free the detenus. In a 2021 instance, the Supreme Court quashed the detention of a Manipur journalist under NSA for critical Facebook posts, calling it a clear abuse of law and violation of Article 19 and 21, showing that the fundamental rights ultimately trump vague national security claims if mala fide.
Summing up the Right to Freedom: These rights ensure that India remains a democracy with not just free elections but also free people who can speak, assemble, pray, travel, and live with dignity. They empower the citizenry to challenge state excesses – whether it’s censorship, police brutality, or unjust laws. At the same time, the Constitution permits the State to impose reasonable restrictions in the interests of larger public goals – a nod to the fact that freedom entails responsibility and cannot be unchecked. The balance between individual freedom and collective security is an ongoing discourse, handled case-by-case by our legislature and judiciary.
The Constitution declares certain grave forms of exploitation as fundamental rights violations, thereby empowering citizens and the state to eradicate them.
Article 23: Prohibits human trafficking and forced labor (begar) and similar forms of forced work. Specifically, “Traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited”. This means that no one can be trafficked for prostitution or slavery, and no one can be forced to work without wages. Even if someone is made to work for a nominal wage that is exploitatively low, it could come under forced labor. This provision is enforceable against the State and private persons – thus, a bonded labor arrangement can be challenged as unconstitutional even if a private landlord is imposing it. Parliament enacted the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 to give effect to Article 23, freeing millions of debt-bonded laborers. In People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) v. Union of India (1982), the Supreme Court famously held that paying workmen less than the minimum wage amounts to “forced labour” because denial of minimum wage takes advantage of poverty and compels people to work for subsistence – violating Article 23【41†L221-L228】. The Court’s proactive interpretation means that any labor compelled by economic circumstances or misuse of authority can be addressed under Article 23. Human trafficking, which includes prostitution, slavery, or the trade of women and children, is flatly forbidden – subsequently, the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act and other laws (like the more recent anti-trafficking bill) aim to implement this. If, for example, a placement agency trafficks minors as domestic servants in cruel conditions, that violates Article 23 and can be punished.
Notably, Article 23 allows the State to impose compulsory service for public purposes (like conscription or community service) as long as it does not discriminate on grounds only of religion, race, caste, or class. For instance, conscription in national emergency (though India hasn’t had compulsory military service) or requiring able-bodied citizens to assist in disaster relief can be seen as “public purpose” exceptions, but such power is seldom used and would still have to be reasonable.
Article 24: Prohibits child labor in factories, mines or other hazardous employment for children under the age of 14. This was a recognition of the exploitative child labor prevalent in India and the need to protect children’s health and development. Laws like the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 (now amended as Child & Adolescent Labour Act, 2016) give teeth to Article 24 by listing hazardous occupations where child labor is banned and regulating conditions of work in others. The right against exploitation has been the basis for progressive initiatives like midday meal schemes (to incentivize schooling over child labor) and rescue of children from bangle factories or firecracker units. The Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996) issued detailed directions to rehabilitate child workers in the Sivakasi firework factories after a tragic accident, including providing alternative adult employment to parents and education to the children. Despite Article 24, we still see violations in practice – tens of thousands of children work illegally in industries like carpet-weaving, beedi-rolling, domestic work, etc. However, with increased enforcement and public awareness, such exploitation is gradually decreasing. Citizens can directly rely on Article 24 to bring Public Interest Litigations (PILs) to free child laborers. For example, NGOs have approached courts to order raids on establishments employing children, treating it as a fundamental rights issue.
Real-life impact: Article 23 has been used to conduct raids on brothels and free victims of human trafficking, and to outlaw harsh practices like begar (a relic where villagers had to work for free for local landlords or officials). Article 23 was also cited in Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajasthan (1983) to ensure that when the government engages people in famine relief work, it must pay them the minimum wage – anything less would be exploitative forced labor, even if the work was “for relief.” Thus, even well-intentioned programs must comply with the non-exploitation principle. Combined with the Directive Principle in Article 39 that children should be protected from exploitation, these rights have also led to the enactment of the Right to Education (Article 21A) so children are in school, not at work. In recent years, there is a push to extend the prohibition of child labor to all under 18 in hazardous work and under 14 in any economic work, aligning with international standards. The judiciary, through cases like Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984), has treated bonded laborers’ plight as a violation of Article 21 (right to life with dignity) read with Article 23, and passed orders to rehabilitate and compensate liberated bonded laborers. This shows the convergence of rights – the Court does not see Part III in silos, but holistically to root out exploitation.
In sum, the Right against Exploitation ensures no human being in India can be treated as chattel or forced to work against their will, especially the most vulnerable like women and children. It enshrines the constitutional principle that human dignity cannot be sacrificed at the altar of economic or social expediency.
India is a secular state with deep religious diversity. Articles 25–28 of the Constitution secure religious freedom to individuals and groups, while maintaining a balance with other social values. These provisions emanate from the ethos of respecting all religions equally (Sarva Dharma Sambhava) and ensuring that the state does not unduly interfere in religious matters, nor privileges any religion.
Article 25: Guarantees to every person (not just citizens) the “freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion”【35†L170-L178】. This means one can hold any religious belief (or none at all), openly practice the rituals and observances of one’s faith, and also propagate (spread) one’s religious beliefs to others. However, this right is subject to public order, morality, and health and to the other Fundamental Rights. It is also subject to any law regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or secular activity associated with religious practice, or providing for social welfare and reform (Article 25(2)). In practical terms, while you can preach or convert someone voluntarily, you cannot sacrifice an animal or a human as part of ritual if it breaches public order or health laws; nor can you excuse bigamy, corruption, or other crimes on religious grounds. The Supreme Court has held that only “essential religious practices” are protected, whereas secular activities connected to religion (like managing property or money of a temple) can be regulated by the State【39†L1-L8】. For example, propagation of religion doesn’t include the right to convert someone through fraud or coercion – Rev. Stainislaus v. Madhya Pradesh (1977) upheld anti-forcible-conversion laws, clarifying that Article 25 does not grant a fundamental right to convert another person (only to propagate one’s faith). On the other hand, food practices (like eating beef or pork) can sometimes become a clash between religion and law – various court cases have considered whether bans on cow slaughter violate Muslims’ religious freedom; most courts upheld such bans citing animal protection (a Directive Principle) and the fact that slaughter for food is not an essential tenet of Islam.
Article 26: Gives religious denominations (or any section thereof) the right to “manage their own affairs in matters of religion”, and to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, and own and acquire property, and administer it in accordance with law. This is a collective right for organized religions or sects, like a church, temple trust, or matha. Under this, a sect can decide how to perform its religious rituals, manage its places of worship, etc., free from state interference, subject again to public order, morality, and health. Many landmark cases involve Article 26: e.g., the Shirur Mutt case (Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Lakshmindra, 1954) where the SC defined “religion” to include all integral practices and held the State cannot take over the administration of a religious institution to the extent of violating the denomination’s autonomy in religious matters. However, the State can regulate the secular administration of properties – for instance, many Hindu temples are governed by state legislations and boards to prevent mismanagement, which courts have allowed so long as core religious activities are not dictated by the government. Essential Practices Doctrine: The Court often examines if a practice claimed to be religious (like a Tandava dance by Ananda Margis in public, or excommunication in a community) is essential to that religion; if not essential, the state’s regulation will stand. This doctrine has been debated – critics say courts shouldn’t decide theology, but it remains the test as of now.
Article 27: Ensures freedom from taxation for promotion of a religion. The State cannot compel any person to pay taxes specifically for the expenses of promoting or maintaining any particular religion or religious institution. In other words, tax money collected by government should not be earmarked to fund religious activities of any one religion. This was put to underscore secularism – public funds should be used in non-discriminatory ways. However, this doesn’t mean religious institutions are exempt from all taxes; they can pay general taxes (like property tax, income tax unless specifically exempted) as any entity, but you cannot have a special tax whose proceeds go exclusively to, say, maintenance of temples or churches. A court example: a fee or cess on pilgrims (used to maintain a temple) might be permissible if it’s a fee for services, not a tax for propagation of religion. Article 27 has not led to as much litigation, but it solidifies the principle of state neutrality in matters of finance and religion.
Article 28: Ensures freedom from religious instruction in certain institutions. It prohibits compulsory religious instruction in any educational institution wholly maintained out of State funds (this covers public schools). In State-aided or recognized institutions, no student can be forced to take part in religious instruction without their (or their guardian’s) consent. The idea is the State will not impose any religion on young minds in schools it runs – reflecting secular education policy. However, institutions run by trusts (such as Madrassas or Missionary schools) that receive aid can teach their religion but cannot compel students of other faiths to attend those classes. Article 28 strikes a balance: while India is not anti-religion, the state education system should not become a tool for religious propagation. An illustrative case is Aruna Roy v. Union of India (2002), where a challenge was raised against Sanskrit hymns and certain religious content in school prayers/curricula as violating secularism. The Supreme Court held that education about all religions (imparting general knowledge of different faiths) is permissible and not “religious instruction” in the proselytizing sense. What Article 28 forbids is indoctrination or preferential teaching of one religion in state schools.
Landmark controversies and cases: The Right to Freedom of Religion often comes into play when religious practices collide with other fundamental rights or social reforms:
Sabarimala Temple Entry case (Indian Young Lawyers Assn. v. State of Kerala, 2018) – The Supreme Court by 4:1 ruled that the practice of barring women of menstruating age from entering the Sabarimala temple violated Hindu women’s right to equality (Article 14) and right to worship under Article 25, and was not an essential practice of the Hindu faith but rather a result of societal discrimination【39†L15-L23】. The temple’s denominational right (Article 26) and the claim of religious custom had to yield to constitutional morality of gender equality. This judgment showcased the conflict between group religious rights and individual rights – the majority held that notions of purity excluding women are patriarchal and unconstitutional, whereas the lone dissenter (Justice Indu Malhotra) cautioned that courts shouldn’t easily interfere in deep religious customs, emphasizing Article 25 also protects a worshipper’s equal entitlement to practice religion【39†L14-L18】. The verdict is under review, reflecting the sensitive balance involved.
Triple Talaq (Shayara Bano, 2017) – While primarily an equality case, it involved religious freedom questions. Muslim bodies argued instant talaq is part of religious law and protected by Article 25. The Supreme Court (3:2 majority) struck down the practice of instantaneous irrevocable divorce as unconstitutional, with one judge calling it not an essential Islamic practice and another judge invoking principles of justice and gender dignity above the freedom to follow an unjust custom. The case led to a law criminalizing triple talaq.
Cow slaughter bans – These have been upheld by courts as a reasonable restriction on religion (for those religions that might not prohibit beef) and as a directive principle implementation. They often pit Article 48 (cow protection directive) and majority community sentiment against minorities’ food practices, but since no religion mandates eating beef, the courts have not seen bans as violating Article 25.
Jehovah’s Witnesses case (Bijoe Emmanuel, 1986) – Three children who were Jehovah’s Witnesses were expelled from school for not singing the national anthem (they stood up respectfully but did not sing, as their faith disallows venerating anyone but God). The Supreme Court held this expulsion violated their freedom of religion (and expression), as they did not disrespect the anthem; their right to conscience under Article 25(1) was upheld. This case is a classic example of secular tolerance – the Court protected a minority sect’s practice as long as it did not threaten public order.
Religious conversions and propagation – as noted, the Stainislaus case (1977) upheld laws in Madhya Pradesh and Odisha that require regulation of religious conversions (to prevent forcible or fraudulent conversion). The freedom to propagate was thus read as not including a right to convert someone against their will. Today, several states have “freedom of religion” laws mandating that a person converting (especially for inter-faith marriage) declare it to authorities. These laws are being litigated – proponents say they prevent deceptive conversions, opponents say they violate privacy and freedom of choice. The ultimate test will be if the restrictions are reasonable and not an attempt to discourage legitimate change of faith.
In essence, the Freedom of Religion under the Constitution seeks to ensure everyone can follow their own faith or no faith, without fear, and the State will not privilege or oppress any religion. But this freedom is not a license to override other social norms – practices derogatory to human rights (like untouchability, or sacrifices, or inequality) can be regulated. The guiding principle, as Dr. Ambedkar articulated, was to “draw a line between the secular and the religious”【39†L5-L13】: the State can intervene in the secular aspects (like managing temple funds or enacting social reform in religions, e.g., Hindu code bill) but must stay neutral in purely spiritual matters. Over 75 years, the judiciary has largely managed to walk this tightrope, though debates (like the ongoing one on defining “essential practices” or women’s temple entry) show it’s a continually evolving domain.
India is a pluralistic society with a mosaic of cultures, languages, scripts, and religions. Articles 29 and 30 secure the rights of minorities and cultural groups to preserve their heritage and have equal access to education, including establishing their own educational institutions. These rights aim to promote the unity in diversity ethos – minorities are assured they won’t be forced to assimilate at the cost of their identity.
Article 29: Protects the cultural and educational rights of any section of citizens. Article 29(1) guarantees that “any section of citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same.” This implies that groups differentiated by language, script, or culture (for example, linguistic minorities like Tamils in Maharashtra or religious communities like Sikhs or art/music traditions) can preserve their heritage – be it through schools, publications, cultural organizations, etc. The State cannot impose a singular culture or forbid them from keeping their language/script alive. A practical effect of Article 29(1) is seen in establishment of linguistic academies, or the right to education in one’s mother tongue (further reinforced by Directive Principle Article 350A and RTE Act which encourage instruction in mother tongue at primary stage).
Article 29(2) adds an important anti-discrimination clause in education: No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid from the State, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. This furthers the secular and egalitarian nature of public education. For example, a government-aided college cannot reserve seats only for students of a particular religion or language (unless it’s a minority institution under Article 30, which is an explicit exception as we’ll see). This provision was at play in cases like St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi (1992) – St. Stephen’s, a Christian minority college, got aid and wanted to reserve 50% seats for Christian students. The Supreme Court held that minority institutions have a special dispensation (Article 30) but can’t completely ignore merit for non-minority applicants; it allowed a 50% minority quota as reasonable, leaving the rest on merit open to all communities. The interplay of Article 29(2) and 30 is complex: minority institutions want autonomy to prefer their community, Article 29(2) wants nondiscrimination in aided institutions. The compromise formula often used is minority institutions can admit a certain quota of their community students, but not 100% if they take state aid, to balance both provisions【52†L168-L176】.
Article 30: Gives religious and linguistic minorities the right to “establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.” This is a key right intended to reassure minorities that they can educate their children in an environment that maintains their culture, language or religion. For example, Christian missionaries can run schools, Muslims can have madrassas or colleges, linguistic communities like Kannadigas in Delhi can set up a Kannada-medium school – and they can manage these institutions. The State cannot nationalize or unduly interfere with these institutions. If the State funds or recognizes them, it can impose certain standards (curriculum, qualifications of teachers, etc.), but it must allow the minority character to be preserved. The State also cannot discriminate in granting aid to minority institutions just because they are managed by minorities (Article 30(2)) – aid cannot be denied on the ground that an institution is minority-run.
Who is a minority? The Constitution did not specify, but the Supreme Court has clarified it is to be determined at the level of the state (for linguistic) and nationwide (for religious, generally). So Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Parsis, etc., are religious minorities in India nationally. Linguistic minorities are relative to state – e.g., Marathi speakers in Karnataka are a minority in that state. Thus, Article 30 would apply to them in that state.
Major cases on Article 30: The scope of this right has been litigated a lot. Re Kerala Education Bill (1958) – an early advisory opinion – held that the State cannot take over the management of minority schools in a way that nullifies the minority’s choice, but regulations for academic excellence and teacher competence are permissible. St. Xavier’s College v. Gujarat (1974) struck down some state regulations encroaching on church-run colleges’ administration (like nominating government representatives on management, etc.) as violative of minority rights. However, it said that a minority institution is not immune from general laws of the land – it’s subject to regulations that do not dilute its minority character or management rights.
The biggest exposition came in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) – an 11-judge bench decision. It dealt with admission and fee regulations in private professional colleges (both minority and non-minority). The Court held that minority institutions have the right to admit students of their community at least to a “reasonable” extent and have some autonomy in fixing fees, but they cannot ignore merit completely (especially in professional/technical colleges) and cannot charge capitation fee (exorbitant donation). It also clarified that the right to “administer” is not absolute – reasonable regulations can be imposed in national interest (like standards of education, qualifications of teachers). Following Pai, the Inamdar case (2005) refined that the State cannot impose reservation policy on minority institutions (as that would be against their choice mandate). In response, the 93rd Amendment (2005) added Article 15(5) to allow affirmative action in private (non-minority) institutions, explicitly exempting minority institutions from its purview【8†L331-L339】. Later, Pramati Educational Society v. Union of India (2014) upheld that exemption, essentially holding that Right to Education (Article 21A) law cannot force minority schools to take 25% economically weaker section students because that would be an unreasonable restriction on Article 30 rights (the RTE Act 2009 mandates 25% free seats in entry-level class for disadvantaged children in all aided/unaided non-minority schools, but minority schools were exempt per Court).
In summary, minority institutions have considerable freedom in running their schools and colleges – including the medium of instruction (many choose mother-tongue instruction), setting their own student intake criteria (which can favor their community), and managing staff (with some preference to community members in staff too, though basics of qualification must be met). The State’s role is limited to ensuring basic academic standards, inter se merit (especially in professional education if they take non-minority students), and public order/health (no institution can promote hatred or ill-will).
Significance: Articles 29 and 30 have allowed India’s myriad communities to preserve their unique identities. You will find, for instance, Bengali-medium schools in Delhi run by Bengali associations, Anglo-Indian schools teaching Western music, Madrassas focusing on Urdu and Islamic theology, Punjabi universities in Patiala, etc. All these flourish under the umbrella of constitutional protection. This framework has been key to allaying fears of cultural domination by any majority – a South Indian in North India can maintain their linguistic school, a Sikh community can be assured its religious schools won’t be taken over. It fosters a sense of security and encourages the vibrant coexistence of cultures.
At the same time, challenges remain: ensuring that the pursuit of community interest in education does not compromise national standards or become a cover for commercialization. The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that “right to administer” is not “right to mal-administer” – so if a minority institution is malfunctioning (e.g., embezzling funds, failing academic standards), the state can intervene to correct it in the interest of students. The balance, as always, is nuanced – but the existence of these rights means minorities always have a constitutional recourse if they feel their cultural or institutional autonomy is unjustly curtailed.
Dr. Ambedkar described Article 32 as “the very heart and soul of the Constitution”, because it is the provision that makes the rest of the Fundamental Rights effective【32†L958-L965】. Article 32 gives every individual the right to move the Supreme Court directly for enforcement of any of the fundamental rights. The Supreme Court is empowered to issue writs, orders, or directions to any person or authority, including writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Certiorari, and Quo Warranto, for the enforcement of rights【32†L970-L978】. These writs are extraordinary remedies inherited from English law:
Habeas Corpus – “produce the body”: a writ to release a person who is unlawfully detained. It’s a bulwark of personal liberty – any friend or relative can petition for someone’s release, and the authority must justify the detention in court. If insufficient cause is shown, the court orders immediate release. This is the antidote to illegal arrests or detentions. During normal times, it has been used to free people from police custody, mental asylums, deprogramming centers, etc. During the Emergency (1975–77), unfortunately, the ADM Jabalpur majority said habeas corpus itself is inoperable if right to life is suspended – a stance now overruled【38†L86-L94】. Post-44th Amendment, habeas corpus cannot be suspended even in Emergency as Article 21 stays in force. So Article 32 habeas remedy is now indefeasible.
Mandamus – “we command”: an order to direct a public official, government, or inferior court to perform a duty they are obligated to. Citizens use mandamus to compel authorities to do their constitutional/statutory duties – for example, to direct a municipality to enforce laws to prevent pollution (if pollution affects right to health – Article 21), or to order a university to declare exam results, etc. It cannot be issued against private parties or against judges (in their judicial capacity).
Prohibition – issued by a higher court (SC or High Court) to a lower court or tribunal, commanding it to stop proceedings in a case that is beyond its jurisdiction or is a gross abuse of jurisdiction. It ensures courts don’t overstep or violate fundamental rights through their proceedings.
Certiorari – the counterpart of Prohibition, but usually issued after a lower court or tribunal has given an order. It quashes that order if found unconstitutional or beyond jurisdiction. These writs (prohibition and certiorari) are tools by which higher courts supervise the legality of lower judicial or quasi-judicial actions, often invoked in administrative law and fundamental rights contexts (e.g., to quash a wrongful conviction by a lower court that violated fair trial rights).
Quo Warranto – “by what authority”: a writ used to challenge the legality of a person’s claim to a public office. For instance, if someone is appointed as a High Court judge or a university VC without having the qualifications, a citizen can seek quo warranto to oust them, asserting the appointment violates the Constitution or law.
Under Article 32, the Supreme Court can craft any appropriate remedy, not just these traditional forms – these writs are mentioned specifically, but the Court’s powers are wide. Over time, the Supreme Court has innovated new mechanisms under Article 32, such as continuing mandamus (keeping a case ongoing to monitor compliance, e.g., in environment or police reform cases) and compensatory relief for rights violations (the Court has awarded monetary compensation within Article 32 to victims of police atrocities, recognizing that traditional remedies weren’t enough).
Importantly, Article 32 is itself a fundamental right. So if legislation attempts to curtail the Supreme Court’s power to issue writs, it could be struck down. During the Emergency, the government made an order under Article 359 suspending the right to move courts for enforcement of rights – which effectively disabled Article 32 for that period. After the Emergency, as noted, the Constitution was amended to ensure such suspension cannot happen for Articles 20–21, and any suspension for other rights must be through formal proclamation. In any case, Article 32 cannot be suspended unless the Constitution itself allows (Article 359 during Emergency)【32†L973-L981】.
A question often arises: Is Article 32 the only way to enforce rights? No – High Courts also have parallel powers under Article 226 to issue writs for enforcement of fundamental rights (and even for other legal rights). In practice, most fundamental rights issues (especially involving local matters or facts) are first taken to High Courts under Article 226, since they are more accessible in the states. The Supreme Court under Article 32 is generally approached for direct issues of great importance or when a person cannot get relief from lower courts. The Supreme Court itself sometimes encourages petitioners to approach a High Court first (not as a rule of law, but as a matter of convenience and federalism). Nonetheless, the existence of Article 32 as a guaranteed right to approach the highest court is a powerful assurance. It has enabled the development of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) – where even a person not personally affected can approach the Court on behalf of those who can’t. Starting in the late 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court opened its doors to letters and postcards as PILs, treating them as Article 32 petitions in cases of bonded labor, prison conditions, environmental pollution, etc. This dramatically expanded access to justice and allowed Article 32 to become the weapon of the public against widespread rights violations.
Dr. Ambedkar’s intent was clear: without remedy, rights are hollow. Article 32 read with 226 gives a multi-layered safety net – citizens can move High Courts or directly the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is termed the “Guardian of Fundamental Rights”. It has original jurisdiction in these matters, meaning one can start a case there (not needing to appeal from a lower court). Over the decades, thousands of Article 32 petitions have upheld the rights of citizens – from trivial matters to major constitutional questions. As an example, when the executive unlawfully detained political opponents during Emergency, some courageous people like Kanu Sanyal and Minerva Mills mills owners filed Article 32 petitions. While those were decided only after the Emergency (in favor of petitioners, striking down draconian laws in Minerva Mills 1980), it showed the Court’s role as ultimate arbiter. In recent times, cases like Vineet Narain (1998) (on fair CBI investigation), Common Cause (various), Anna Matajee (2020) (seeking enforcement of right to internet as part of speech in Kashmir lockdown) were all under Article 32 jurisdiction.
One must note, Article 32 can only be invoked for fundamental rights issues. If a petition raises no issue of Part III but only other legal rights, the Supreme Court would not entertain it under Article 32 (though the High Court might under 226). As the Court said, Article 32 is itself a fundamental right, so it will not be rendered impotent or postponed – the Supreme Court cannot refuse to entertain a genuine rights violation. There have been waves of judicial activism where Article 32 was used to direct many government policies (PIL era), and also phases of restraint. But its presence in the constitutional scheme is unquestionably crucial for the maintenance of the rule of law.
To illustrate, consider a real-life scenario: Suppose a journalist is unlawfully arrested in the middle of the night for writing an article critical of the government, with no formal charges. The next morning, a lawyer could file a habeas corpus petition under Article 32 in the Supreme Court. The Court can immediately issue notice to the police to produce the journalist and justify the arrest. If the Court finds the detention illegal (say, it was to harass and no valid law is cited), it will order the journalist’s release. This swift remedy at the highest level is what makes fundamental rights “fundamental”. In absence of Article 32/226, one might be at the mercy of the detaining authority, which is why authoritarian regimes often curb judicial review. Our Constitution insulates this right by making it itself fundamental.
In conclusion, the Right to Constitutional Remedies is what makes Fundamental Rights justiciable and real. It is the mechanism that transforms the Constitution from a mere declaration of principles to a working charter of liberties. As the Supreme Court declared in L. Chandra Kumar (1997), “the power of judicial review (enforcing fundamental rights) is part of the basic structure of the Constitution”, meaning even a constitutional amendment cannot whittle down the courts’ power to review executive or legislative actions that infringe fundamental rights【19†L65-L69】【20†L1-L4】. It is this remedy that gives teeth to our Fundamental Rights and confidence to our citizens.
While Fundamental Rights are sacrosanct, they are not absolute. The Constitution itself, as well as judicial interpretations, have placed certain reasonable restrictions on the exercise of these rights to ensure that one person’s liberty does not infringe upon the welfare of others or the security of the nation. Alongside rights, the Constitution (in Part IV-A, Article 51A) also enumerates Fundamental Duties of citizens – like respecting the Constitution, the national flag and anthem, cherishing noble ideals of the freedom struggle, protecting sovereignty, promoting harmony, preserving the environment, etc. Although these duties are not enforceable in courts, they serve as a constant reminder that rights come with responsibilities. The system thus envisages a balance between rights and duties, between individual freedom and collective good.
Here are key aspects of how rights are balanced and restricted:
Explicit Restrictions in the Constitution: As discussed, many rights have built-in restriction clauses. Article 19 has detailed sub-clauses (2) to (6) listing grounds on which the State can legitimately restrict freedoms (e.g., speech can be restricted for security of state, public order, etc.【29†L198-L204】; assembly can be restricted for public order; movement for security or public interest; profession in interest of public health, morality, etc.). Article 25 is subject to public order, morality, health, and other provisions, which meant social reform laws like opening Hindu temples to all castes or banning Sati were upheld even if they hurt orthodox sentiments – essentially, religious freedom cannot justify practices that society or law find reprehensible or that violate someone else’s rights. Even the right to life (Article 21) has the phrase “procedure established by law”, meaning if a fair law authorizes deprivation of life (e.g., death penalty for rare crimes, upheld in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) as constitutional when applied in the “rarest of rare” cases), then it’s allowed. So, no right is unchecked – the Constitution strikes a balance by permitting the State to regulate rights for common interests.
Security of State and Emergency: The Constitution allows suspension of certain rights during a National Emergency (Article 352) – originally, all except Articles 20-21 could be suspended. Post-44th Amendment, now even during Emergency, Articles 20 and 21 remain in force, and others can be suspended only by specific presidential order (Article 359). India has had three national emergencies (1962 war, 1971 war, 1975 internal emergency). During those times (especially 1975-77), rights like free speech, free press, freedom of assembly were curtailed heavily. The lesson learned was to tighten the criteria for emergency (44th Amendment made it harder to declare, and judicial review is now available). At state levels, during President’s Rule or local disturbances, certain rights may de facto get curtailed (curfews, censorship) but citizens can challenge them if disproportionate.
Public Order and Policing: On a day-to-day basis, rights like speech and assembly are balanced against public order. The IPC, CrPC, and special laws like the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) criminalize speech or association that incites violence, hatred or threatens the state. For example, sedition law (IPC 124A) punishes attempts to excite disaffection against the government. This colonial provision has been criticized as being abused to stifle dissent (e.g., people charged for merely criticizing the government). The Supreme Court in the past upheld sedition in Kedar Nath Singh (1962) but read it narrowly to apply only when there is incitement to violence or disorder. In 2022, the SC intervened by staying all pending sedition cases, signaling a relook at its constitutionality【10†L37-L40】. This illustrates how the judiciary recalibrates the balance – if a restriction is being misused to curb legitimate speech, the Court may strike it down or read it strictly.
Rights vs. Other Rights: Sometimes two fundamental rights conflict. For instance, one person’s religious practice might violate another’s equality (as in Sabarimala case women’s right vs denominational freedom), or a group’s free speech might threaten another’s right to life (hate speech causing harm to a community). The courts then have to harmonize – usually by finding that the right which preserves dignity and equality will trump a practice that is not essential or is discriminatory. In the Naz Foundation case (2009) and Navtej Johar (2018), the right to privacy, dignity, and equality of LGBTQ persons was balanced against archaic morality arguments; the courts decided that “constitutional morality” – meaning the values of the Constitution like liberty and equality – must prevail over public morality or religious disapproval. The term constitutional morality has gained currency: it implies that while citizens are free to have personal or religious morality, laws and state actions must conform to the Constitution’s liberal, pluralistic morality. This concept often tilts the balance in favor of individual rights when faced with majoritarian cultural norms.
Fundamental Duties and Directive Principles: Though not enforceable, these can influence interpretation of rights. For example, one of the Fundamental Duties (Article 51A) is to “promote harmony and spirit of common brotherhood” and “renounce practices derogatory to women”. Courts have sometimes referenced duties to uphold laws that may encroach on rights but further a constitutional value. A classic scenario: laws penalizing desecration of the national flag or insult to the Constitution – one could argue it limits free expression, but the duty to respect national symbols (51A) guides the court to uphold such law as a reasonable restriction in interest of sovereignty/national honor. Similarly, Directive Principles (Part IV) like prohibiting cow slaughter (Art 48) or banning intoxicating drinks (Art 47) have been used to justify restrictions on business or dietary choice as reasonable, to advance social policy. The Supreme Court noted that Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles are complementary – while the former are immediate enforceable rights, the latter are goals for social revolution; when possible, interpretation should harmonize them (as in Minerva Mills, 1980, basic structure includes harmony of Part III and IV).
Basic Structure and Amendments: Parliament can amend rights (many rights have been amended, like Article 19(2) grounds expanded in 1st Amendment; right to property removed by 44th, reservation provisions expanded in 77th, 81st, 101st, 103rd amendments, etc.). But amendments affecting fundamental rights are subject to the “basic structure” test (per Kesavananda Bharati, 1973【19†L65-L69】). If an amendment is abrogative of the core of a right (and thus of the Constitution’s basic structure), the Court can strike it down. This is a check on legislative power – e.g., the 42nd Amendment (1976) attempted to make any law implementing Directive Principles immune from rights challenge (Article 31C extended to all DPs, not just 39b&c); the SC in Minerva Mills (1980) struck down that extension as it took away judicial review and disturbed balance between rights and principles. Thus, even constitutional amendments must keep the balance; rights cannot be excessively curtailed under the guise of amendment.
Judicial Self-Restraint: The judiciary itself sometimes balances by restraint. In matters involving national security or complex economic policy, courts have been cautious in striking down restrictions. For instance, during wartime or insurgencies, censorship on press or curfews are generally given leeway if properly imposed. In the Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) case regarding the Kashmir internet shutdown, the SC recognized that freedom of speech includes the medium of internet, but stopped short of declaring internet access a fundamental right per se. It asked the government to review the situation and ensure proportionality of restrictions. The outcome was a partial restoration and a new precedent that indefinite internet shutdowns violate the requirement of reasonableness. So courts require that even in security situations, restrictions must be reviewed and not arbitrary or over-broad.
Fundamental Duties angle: Although one cannot go to court to enforce Fundamental Duties, they carry moral weight. Government often promotes them through public awareness (e.g., insisting on respect for the National Anthem, cleanliness drives under duty to keep environment clean, etc.). There have been instances of laws indirectly referencing duties – e.g., a school regulation making singing of national anthem compulsory was challenged (the Jehovah’s Witness case above) – the Court balanced the duty to respect national symbols with the right to conscience, coming out in favor of the latter because the kids did not disrespect the anthem; they stood up in respect but didn’t sing due to faith. This nuanced stance shows that duties inspire but don’t automatically override rights.
However, duty to protect the environment (Art 51A(g)) has buttressed court orders on pollution control (the logic: citizens have a duty too, not just right to clean environment). Similarly, duty to cherish noble freedom struggle ideals (51A(b)) is cited in judgments dealing with preservation of monuments, etc. The duty of fraternity (51A(e)) – promoting harmony – played a role in court emphasizing secularism and anti-hate speech norms. In essence, Fundamental Duties and constitutional ideals act as a compass to ensure that freedom does not degenerate into license or anarchy. They remind citizens that the Constitution is not just a document of rights, but also of responsibilities – each individual should exercise their rights with respect for the rights of others and the unity of the nation.
Reasonable restriction doctrine: The test of a restriction being “reasonable” has been developed in many rulings. A restriction must not be excessive or out of proportion to the aim. There should be an intelligible principle and rational nexus (like the test in Article 14 for classification【28†L33-L39】) for the restriction. Laws arbitrarily singling out individuals or restricting more liberty than necessary have been invalidated. The doctrine of proportionality (borrowed from European law) is increasingly applied: a restriction must be least intrusive to achieve the state’s objective. For example, if the goal is preventing rumor-mongering, a narrowly tailored order on specific hateful content is more proportionate than a blanket internet ban for months.
To conclude this section, the Constitution achieves a balance by granting wide fundamental rights but permitting carefully defined limits. It expects citizens to use their freedoms in a spirit of “constitutional morality” and fraternity. The judiciary serves as the referee – if either the State overreaches with restrictions or if someone abuses rights to harm others, the courts step in to restore equilibrium. This dynamic equilibrium is crucial in a society as complex as India’s, to ensure one person’s rights do not become another’s wrongs.
Supreme Court on Women’s Rights (2022–2024): A number of important rulings have reaffirmed women’s autonomy, dignity, and equality as part of fundamental rights.
In X v. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Govt of NCT of Delhi (2022), the Supreme Court held that unmarried women are also entitled to seek abortion up to 24 weeks under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act. The Court emphasized that reproductive autonomy is intrinsic to Article 21, and the law must not discriminate based on marital status.
In 2023, the Supreme Court passed guidelines to curb gender stereotyping in court language, noting that even the language used by judges and lawyers must respect women's dignity and not reinforce patriarchal norms — aligning with the right to equality (Article 14) and dignity (Article 21).
On workplace safety, the Court has emphasized compliance with the PoSH (Prevention of Sexual Harassment) Act, making it part of Article 21’s guarantee of a safe and dignified work environment.
Right to Internet as a Fundamental Right: Although the Court has not declared internet access per se as a standalone fundamental right, in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020), the Supreme Court stated that freedom of speech and trade under Article 19 applies to the medium of the internet. Hence, indefinite internet shutdowns violate constitutional principles unless they satisfy the tests of necessity, proportionality, and reasonableness. This case set procedural guardrails on how internet access can be curtailed — reinforcing digital rights as an essential part of modern liberty.
Data Protection and Right to Privacy (2023–2024): Following the Puttaswamy judgment, India passed the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, aiming to operationalize privacy as a fundamental right. While the law gives individuals the right to access, correct, and erase their data, critics argue it grants broad exemptions to the State, which may dilute the right to privacy. The implementation of this Act, and future Supreme Court tests, will determine how the balance between national interest and individual privacy evolves.
Recognition of Civil Rights for Transgender Persons: After NALSA v. Union of India (2014) declared transgender persons a “third gender” with full fundamental rights, the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 was enacted. While the Act offers some protection (non-discrimination, access to healthcare, education, etc.), parts of it have been challenged for not being aligned with the self-identification principle. The Supreme Court has continued to recognize gender identity, autonomy, and dignity as core constitutional rights under Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21.
Citizenship and NRC/CAA Debates (2019–Present): The enactment of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), 2019, which fast-tracks citizenship for persecuted non-Muslim minorities from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, led to nationwide protests. Critics claim it violates Article 14 (equality before law) by excluding Muslims. The government argues it applies to foreigners and is a positive discrimination for vulnerable groups. The matter is pending in the Supreme Court. Similarly, concerns around the National Register of Citizens (NRC) and the right to citizenship, identity, and non-discrimination under the Constitution have placed Articles 14 and 21 at the center of the debate.
SC's Role in Climate Justice: In a landmark April 2024 decision, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the “Right to be Free from Adverse Climate Effects” under Article 21, tying environmental degradation to the fundamental right to life and health. This judgment allows individuals to challenge large polluting projects, asserting that climate action is no longer a policy preference but a rights-based imperative.
Rising Use of Preventive Detention and UAPA: The increasing use of preventive detention laws like the NSA (National Security Act) and stringent provisions under UAPA (Unlawful Activities Prevention Act) has sparked debate over civil liberties. While the government cites national security, many civil liberties advocates argue these laws infringe upon Articles 21 and 22, especially when detentions occur without prompt judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court has called for stricter safeguards and justiciability of detentions, particularly when used against journalists and protestors.
Digital Surveillance and Pegasus: Revelations that journalists, activists, and political figures may have been surveilled using Pegasus spyware raised significant alarm over Article 21 (privacy) and Article 19 (freedom of expression). In 2021, the Supreme Court appointed an independent technical committee to probe the matter and affirmed that the State cannot act as an unchecked surveilling authority. The outcome reaffirmed the idea that even national security must follow constitutional procedures.
Same-Sex Marriage Ruling (2023): In Supriyo v. Union of India (2023), the Supreme Court declined to legalize same-sex marriage under existing laws but acknowledged that LGBTQ persons have full constitutional rights under Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21, including the right to cohabit, make medical decisions for partners, and access dignity in public life. The Court urged Parliament to act. Though a disappointment for marriage equality, the case marked a further normalization of LGBTQ rights under fundamental rights, and the groundwork for future legal reform.
Fundamental Rights under the Indian Constitution are not frozen in time — they are dynamic, living guarantees that evolve with the needs of society. They empower citizens to challenge injustice, question the government, and shape a more equitable democracy. As our laws and technology evolve, new dimensions such as digital rights, environmental justice, data privacy, and bodily autonomy are being interpreted through the lens of Part III.
The judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, continues to play a pivotal role in interpreting, expanding, and enforcing these rights, ensuring the Constitution remains a vibrant protector of liberty, dignity, and justice.
Understanding your Fundamental Rights isn’t just about knowing your entitlements — it’s about participating in and preserving the constitutional fabric of India.